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I. INTRODUCTION: “SEXTING:” WHAT IT IS AND THE PROBLEMS IT 
CREATES 
The term “sexting” is a socially created slang word that is a 
combination of the words “sex” and “texting.”1  While “sexting” has not 
been legally defined, there are several commonly accepted definitions.  
The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, in its 2009 
Policy Statement on Sexting, defined sexting as the action of a “youth 
writing sexually explicit messages, taking sexually explicit photos of 
themselves or others in their peer group, and transmitting those photos 
and/or messages to their peers.”2  The Crisis Intervention Center defines 
sexting as “sending, receiving, or forwarding sexually suggestive nude or 
nearly nude photos or sexually suggestive messages through text 
message or email.”3 
Sexting has become a rising problem in the United States because 
of the prevalence of technology that individuals use to communicate with 
one another.4  Also, people are more likely to speak their minds and let 
go of their inhibitions when they hide behind the screen of a phone or 
computer, due to the anonymity technology provides along with its 
simplicity of communication.5  But what many teens do not realize is that 
a private message, once sent, is no longer private and any message or 
photo sent between teens has the potential to be broadcast to the world 
on the Internet.6  These actions result in serious consequences to the 
teenagers involved; such consequences are not only emotional, but legal 
                                                                                                             
 1 Theresa Edmund, Ringwood Community Addresses Sexting, NORTHJERSEY.COM 
(Feb. 21, 2010, 10:36 AM EST), http://www.northjersey.com/news/education/84932002_ 
Parents__students_get__the_4-1-1_on_sexting_.html. 
 2 NAT’L CENTER FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, Policy Statement on Sexting, 
(Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet? 
LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=4130. 
 3 CRISIS INTERVENTION CENTER, What is Sexting, 2010, 
http://www.crisisinterventioncenter.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=147:what-is-sexting&catid=39:teens&Itemid=79 (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
 4 Edmund, supra note 1. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Jillian Jorgensen, There’s No Privacy with ‘Sexting,’ Officials Warn, County 
Attorneys See Increase in Cases of Dangerously Intimate Messaging Practice, EAGLE-
TRIBUNE (North Andover, Mass), Mar. 21, 2010, 
http://www.eagletribune.com/newhampshire/x434657239/Theres-no-privacy-with-
sexting-officials-warn. 
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as well.7  As the issue of sexting continues to develop, the Third Circuit’s 
decision in Miller v. Mitchell8 will likely provide the groundwork for 
new legislation and potential circuit splits.  This Comment argues that 
education is an important starting point in solving the problem of teenage 
sexting.  In Miller, students suspected of sexting were given the option of 
either attending a sexting educational program or being criminally 
charged with felony possession or distribution of child pornography.9  
When three teenagers refused to participate in the educational program, 
their parents sued the District Attorney (“D.A.”) in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania in an effort to enjoin the D.A. from bringing criminal 
charges. 10   The District Court granted the parents a preliminary 
injunction and the Third Circuit affirmed.11 
This Comment analyzes the Third Circuit’s decision in Miller and 
argues that requiring students to attend an educational program about 
sexting does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the 
government has a compelling interest in protecting children from the 
harmful effects of sexting.12  Additionally, requiring students to attend 
sexting educational classes does not violate children’s constitutional 
rights because children do not receive the same constitutional protection 
of their rights that adults receive.13  Children’s rights are limited when 
they are in school and when their safety or well being is in danger.14  
This Comment examines the question: Who bears the responsibility of 
teaching children about the risks associated with sexting: parents or the 
government?  The problems caused by sexting must be solved through 
government intervention.  Specifically, the sexting education program 
described in Miller is a practical option that the government can use to 
educate teenagers about the dangers of sexting. 
In Part II, this Comment provides background information 
surrounding the rise of sexting as a widespread phenomenon, including 
the growing problems associated with sexting.  Additionally, Part II 
analyzes Miller v. Mitchell, and focuses on whether forcing students to 
participate in a sexting educational program violates parents’ 
fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment to raise their 
                                                                                                             
 7 See infra Part II for a discussion on the legal and emotional consequences of 
sexting, such as pornography charges, bullying, and suicidal tendencies. 
 8 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 9 Id. at 142. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 143. 
 12 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988). 
 13 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
 14 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339–40. 
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children free from government interference. 15   Part III discusses the 
history of this fundamental right.  Also, it examines the subsequent 
judicial limitations of this right under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
explains that the government can constitutionally limit a parent’s rights 
when a child’s health or well being is in danger.  Part III further 
illuminates the way in which this limitation should apply to sexting 
educational programs. 
Part IV provides additional information about other instances in 
which the government can limit parents’ Fourteenth Amendment right to 
raise their children.  Government limitations on the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to parent without state interference are permissible 
when the limitation relates to education;16 in particular, the government 
may impose such limitations through state truancy laws and mandatory 
educational subjects such as sex education classes.17  Sexting education 
classes fall under this educational limit of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In Part V, this Comment argues that requiring students to attend 
sexting education classes does not violate children’s constitutional rights.  
The scope of this Comment is restricted to a discussion of the limitations 
of children’s constitutional rights while they attend public school.  The 
government should be permitted to require students to attend sexting 
education classes because the constitutional rights of children are not as 
expansive as the rights of adults.18  Although the government cannot 
threaten criminal prosecution if an adult exercises a constitutionally 
protected right, children’s constitutional rights are restricted, especially 
while in school.19 The limited breadth of children’s constitutional rights 
is due to the state’s role as custodian or in loco parentis to the children in 
its jurisdiction.20 
Finally, Part V discusses possible remedies to help deal with the 
problem of teenage sexting.  Education is an important starting point in 
solving the teenage sexting problem.  This Comment argues that, 
although parents have a fundamental Fourteenth Amendment right to 
raise their children without government intervention, 21  the sexting 
                                                                                                             
 15 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (U.S. 1978) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 231–33 (U.S. 1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (U.S. 1972); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1923)). 
 16 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336, 339–40. 
 17 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); Smith v. Ricci, 89 N.J. 514, 
525 (1982). 
 18 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
 19 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339–40 (1985). 
 20 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. 
 21 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (U.S. 1978) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 231–33 (U.S. 1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (U.S. 1972); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1923)). 
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problem presents a compelling state interest that calls for government 
intervention.  Such a resolution would continue the Supreme Court’s 
established policy22 of limiting parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights in 
order to uphold the state’s power of in loco parentis23 as well as the 
public school system’s power under the special needs doctrine.24  Sexting 
is a problem from which the government needs to protect children, 
especially because sexting affects children’s school activities and 
education. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A.  The Development of Sexting as a Widespread Problem 
Not only is sexting becoming a phenomenon, but it is clear that 
teenagers do not perceive the negative effects associated with texting and 
are ill-equipped to deal with these consequences; because teenagers 
could face criminal charges in addition to reputational damage, the stakes 
of sexting are high.  First, it is clear that sexting among school-age 
children is on the rise.  The National Campaign to Prevent Teen and 
Unplanned Pregnancy and CosmoGirl.com conducted the first survey 
about sexting among teenagers in 2008.25  The study found that twenty 
percent of teenagers and thirty-three percent of young adults have sent 
sexually suggestive pictures or videos of themselves to peers or have 
posted them on the Internet.26  The study also found that thirty-nine 
percent of all teens and fifty-nine percent of all young adults have sent or 
posted sexually suggestive messages other than images.27 
                                                                                                             
 22 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); See also discussion infra Part 
III(A)(2). 
 23 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. 
 24 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653, 655 (1995). 
 25 NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY & 
COSMOGIRL.COM, SEX AND TECH: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND YOUNG 
ADULTS, THENATIONALCAMPAIGN.ORG, at 1 (2008),  
http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech_Summary.pdf.  The survey 
was conducted online with a total of 1,280 individuals; Six hundred and fifty-three of 
them were teenagers from ages thirteen to nineteen and 627 were young adults, ages 
twenty to twenty-six.  Id. 
 26 Id. In the National Campaign study, “young adults” encompassed those between 
the ages of twenty and twenty-six.  The study defines sexually suggestive picture or video 
as “semi-nude or nude personal pictures or video taken of oneself and not found on the 
Internet, or received from a stranger (like spam), etc.”  Id. 
 27 Id. The study defines sexually suggestive messages as “sexually suggestive written 
personal texts, emails, IMs, etc.—and not those you might receive from a stranger (like 
spam), etc.”  Id. 
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The study discovered that most teens and young adults send these 
pictures and messages to their boyfriends or girlfriends.28  There are, 
however, many teens and young adults who send the pictures and 
messages to someone they have met only online or to someone they hope 
to date.29  Twenty-one percent of teen girls and thirty-nine percent of 
teen boys who have “texted” sexually explicit material to someone else 
have also sent it to someone they were not currently dating, but only 
hoped to date. 30   The percentages were similar for young adults. 31  
Fifteen percent of all teens who have sent nude or seminude pictures, 
sent them to someone they had never met and only knew online.32  For 
young adults, this number was similar; fifteen percent of women and 
twenty-three percent of men stated that they had sexted nude or 
seminude photographs of themselves to someone they had never met and 
only knew online.33 
Second, it is clear that teenagers who engage in sexting are unaware 
of the potential consequences of their conduct.  Most polled teenagers 
and young adults stated that they knew that sending or posting sexually 
suggestive material is potentially dangerous, but they continued to do it 
anyway.34  But less than half recognized that the material they send via 
text is often shared with other people.35  The study found several reasons 
why teens and young adults send the sexually suggestive material.  Most 
of the respondents said they send and post the pictures and messages 
because it is “fun and flirtatious.”36  About half of teen girls say that 
“pressure from a guy” is a reason they send the messages or pictures; 
only eighteen percent of boys cited pressures from girls as a reason for 
sexting.37 
In 2009, Cox Communications conducted a different study on teen 
sexting.38  The study found that one in five teenagers have sexted by 
                                                                                                             
 28 Id. at 2. 
 29 NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY & 
COSMOGIRL.COM, supra note 25. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 2 (reporting that twenty-one percent of young adult women and thirty percent 
of young men have sent sexually explicit material to someone else they met online or 
merely hoped to date). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 3. 
 35 NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY & 
COSMOGIRL.COM, supra note 25, at 3. 
 36 Id. at 4.  This number was sixty-six percent of teen girls and sixty percent of teen 
boys and seventy-two percent of women and seventy percent of men. Id. 
 37 Id. at 4. 
 38 COX COMMC’NS, TEEN ONLINE & WIRELESS SAFETY SURVEY: CYBERBULLYING, 
SEXTING, AND PARENTAL CONTROLS (May 2009), 
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sending, receiving, or forwarding sexually explicit material.39  About ten 
percent of these teenagers have sent sexually suggestive material to 
people they do not personally know or have only met online.40  Almost 
all of the teenagers who have sent “sexts” believed that nothing bad has 
happened to them as a result of sexting, yet thirty percent of those 
teenagers reported that these photographs were forwarded to someone 
else.41  Very few teenagers who have admitted to sexting have ever been 
caught sending or receiving a message.42  Finally, almost all teenagers 
who participated in the study knew that it could be dangerous to send 
photographs of themselves.43  The study also found that, by contrast, 
only slightly over half of the teenagers surveyed knew that there are legal 
consequences, such as criminal prosecution, for engaging in sexting.44  
Clearly, teenagers recognize that there are dangers associated with 
sexting, but they do not appreciate the gravity of the potential harm 
because they do not know all of the potential ramifications, such as legal 
consequences.  Many teenagers continue to sext despite acknowledging 
that there are possible repercussions for their conduct. 
Advances in technology exacerbate the dangers—legal and 
extralegal—posed to teenagers by sexting.  In particular, most teenagers 
do not know the legal consequences of their actions.45  In many states, 
teenagers who send, receive, and forward sexually explicit messages face 
consequences such as violating child pornography laws.46  This is true 
even if the pictures and videos depict the sender.47  There are also many 
nonlegal, often long term, consequences that teenagers do not 
understand. 48   Teenagers do not realize that once they send the 
photographs, the recipient has full control over the image. 49   The 
recipient of the photograph could choose to keep the image to himself or 
                                                                                                             
http://www.cox.com/takecharge/safe_teens_2009/research.html (last visited DATE) (web 
address no longer available). Cox Communications conducted this study among teens 
from ages thirteen to eighteen.  Id.  The study defines “sexting” as the practice of 
“sending sexually suggestive text messages or emails with nude or nearly-nude photos.” 
Id. at 3. 
 39 Id. at 11. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 38. 
 42 Id. at 39. 
 43 Id. at 43. 
 44 COX COMMC’NS, supra note 38, at 43. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Elizabeth C. Eraker, Stemming Sexting: Sensible Legal Approaches to Teenagers’ 
Exchange of Self-Produced Pornography, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555, 557 (2010). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY & 
COSMOGIRL.COM, supra note 25, at 3. 
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herself, but could also choose to further disseminate it.  Photographs on 
the Internet can be easily shared with others and can remain on the 
Internet forever.50  This could negatively affect the individual’s future 
education and career prospects if the photographs appear in a college or 
employer’s investigation.51 
Bullying is another problem that has been connected with sexting.  
In 2008, eighteen-year-old Jesse Logan committed suicide after being 
bullied about the nude photographs she had sent to her boyfriend.52  After 
Jesse and her boyfriend broke up, he distributed the photographs to other 
girls in their high school.53  The girls bullied Jesse by labeling her with 
slurs such as “whore” and “slut,” and by throwing objects at her, causing 
Jesse to become depressed and ultimately commit suicide.54  This case is 
not unique.55 
Recently, in Washington State, eighth-grader Margarite used her 
phone to send a nude picture to her boyfriend, Isaiah.56   After their 
relationship ended, he forwarded the saved picture to Margarite’s friend, 
who then forwarded the picture to everyone in her phone’s contact list.57  
Consequently, the entire school obtained a copy of the photograph; 
Margarite’s friends shunned and bullied her.58  Authorities charged three 
students, including Isaiah and Margarite’s former friend, with felonies of 
disseminating child pornography.59  The students faced prison time in a 
juvenile detention center and were required to register as sex offenders.60  
Margarite must permanently live with the consequences of her actions. 
B. Miller v. Mitchell: A New Problem for the Federal Courts 
Sexting has also caught the attention of the United States judicial 
system.  Perhaps due to the increasing public attention given to the issue, 
the courts have taken up sexting as an important subject of criminal and 
                                                                                                             
 50 Id.  Content can remain on the Internet even after it has been deleted by the person 
who posted it.  Content can also be copied from the Internet before it is erased and saved 
on that person’s computer.  See id. 
 51 Eraker, supra note 46, at 557. 
 52 Mike Celizic, Her Teen Committed Suicide Over ‘Sexting,’ MSNBC TODAY: 
PARENTING (Mar. 6, 2009, 9:26 AM EST), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/29546030. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See, Michael Inbar, ‘Sexting’ Bullying Cited in Teen’s Suicide, MSNBC TODAY: 
PEOPLE (Dec. 2, 2009, 10:26:16 AM EST), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/34236377. 
 56 Jann Hoffman, A Girl’s Nude Photo, and Altered Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 
2011, at A1. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 2. 
 60 Id. at 3. 
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civil disputes.  Sexting cases are relevant to the federal courts due to 
claims involving the constitutional rights of teenagers and their parents.  
Miller v. Mitchell 61  is the first circuit court case to address the 
constitutionality of prosecuting teenagers for sexting. 
The plaintiffs in Miller defined “sexting” as “the practice of 
sending or posting sexually suggestive text messages and images, 
including nude or semi-nude photographs, via cellular telephones or over 
the Internet.”62  In Miller, school district officials in Pennsylvania found 
students’ cell phones containing nude photos of several teenage female 
students in their district.63  The district officials discovered that students 
had been exchanging the images on their phones and gave the phones to 
the Wyoming County District Attorney’s Office. 64   The District 
Attorney, George Skumanick, launched an investigation and announced 
to reporters that students possessing these images could be prosecuted for 
violating either of two Pennsylvania statutes.65 
District Attorney Skumanick’s claims against the students were 
twofold.  First, he claimed that the students could be prosecuted for 
possessing or distributing child pornography under a statute involving 
the sexual abuse of children.66  The statute makes it a crime for any 
person to depict a child under eighteen years old engaging in a sexual act 
or an imitation of the act and makes it a crime to knowingly distribute or 
transfer any material that shows a child engaging in a sexual act or 
simulation.67  It is also an offense to “intentionally view” or “knowingly 
possess” this material.68  Second, the District Attorney claimed that the 
students could be prosecuted under the statute prohibiting the “criminal 
use of a communication facility,”69  which states that it is a criminal 
offense to use a communication facility, such as a phone, to commit or 
facilitate a felony.70 
District Attorney Skumanick then sent a letter to the parents of 
sixteen to twenty students whose cell phones allegedly contained the 
sexually explicit images and to the students depicted in the photos.71  The 
letter stated that charges would be brought against the students unless 
                                                                                                             
 61 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 62 Id. at 143. 
 63 Id.  School officials learned that male students were trading these images over their 
phones and then confiscated the suspected students’ phones.  Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312 (2011). 
 67 Id. at § 6312(b)–(c). 
 68 Id. at § 6312(d). 
 69 Miller, 598 F.3d at 143 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7512 (2011)). 
 70 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7512 (2011). 
 71 Miller, 598 F.3d at 143. 
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they participated in an educational program. 72   Participation in the 
program was voluntary; however, if the student completed it, then no 
charges would be filed and there would be no record of the student’s 
involvement in criminal activity.73  The District Attorney’s office, the 
Juvenile Probation Department, and the Victims Resource Center 
designed the program, the goal of which was to counsel and educate 
students about the dangers of sexting.74  The proposed program would 
last six to nine months,75 and if a student did not complete the program, 
the District Attorney would file charges against that student for 
possessing or distributing child pornography.76 
The proposed educational program separated male from female 
students and required each student to write an essay explaining what he 
or she did and why it was wrong.77  The topics comprising the program 
included sexual violence, sexual harassment, and sessions titled “Gender 
identity-Gender strengths” and “Self Concept.”78  An example of one of 
the female group objectives was to “gain an understanding of what it 
means to be a girl in today’s society, both advantages and 
disadvantages.”79  All of the parents agreed to the program except for the 
parents of the three students who filed the suit.80 
The parents of these three students responded by obtaining 
assistance from the American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, and 
filing for a temporary restraining order enjoining the District Attorney 
from charging the teenagers.  At the trial level, the plaintiffs in Miller 
brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil cause of 
action when a state official has deprived an individual of his or her 
constitutional rights.81  To prevail on a § 1983 claim, plaintiffs must 
                                                                                                             
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 143–44. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 144. 
 77 Miller, 598 F.3d at 144.  In the first session of the program, the students were 
required to write “a report explaining why you are here, [w]hat you did, [w]hy it was 
wrong, [d]id you create a victim? If so, who? [A]nd how their actions affect[ed] the 
victim[,] [t]he school[, and] the community.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 145. 
 81 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress . . . . 
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prove that their actions were constitutionally protected and the 
government retaliated in response to those actions. 82   The plaintiffs 
claimed that Pennsylvania’s District Attorney threatened prosecution as 
retaliation for the exercise of three different constitutionally protected 
rights.83 
First, the plaintiffs maintained that the District Attorney’s threat of 
prosecution and imposition of a sexting education requirement was made 
in retaliation for the students’ exercise of their First Amendment right of 
free speech and expression.84  They asserted that the students’ actions of 
appearing in the photographs were constitutionally protected expressions 
under the First Amendment. 85  Second, plaintiffs maintained that the 
District Attorney’s threat of prosecution violated the students’ First 
Amendment right against compelled speech because the program 
required the students to write an essay explaining their actions and why 
they were wrong.86  They claimed that the essay requirement constituted 
a violation of the students’ First Amendment rights because it forced the 
students to write something they may not have believed: that in sending 
sexually explicit text messages, they engaged in improper or unethical 
acts.87  Lastly, the plaintiffs claimed that the District Attorney’s threat of 
prosecution was retaliatory and violated the parents’ Fourteenth 
Amendment right to be free from governmental interference in raising 
their children.88  They claimed that the required educational program 
would violate this right because parents should decide whether the 
material contained in the program is necessary and beneficial for their 
children’s upbringing.89 
The plaintiffs sought immediate relief in the form of a temporary 
restraining order restricting the District Attorney from filing criminal 
charges against the students who refused to participate in the program.90  
The District Court granted the plaintiffs’ injunction on their First 
Amendment compelled speech and Fourteenth Amendment claims only; 
the court rejected the First Amendment free speech and expression 
claim. 91   The court granted the temporary restraining order, thereby 
                                                                                                             
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 82 Miller, 598 F.3d at 147 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 
F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
 83 Id. at 147. 
 84 Id. at 148. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Miller, 598 F.3d at 148. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
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restricting the District Attorney from bringing charges against the 
students. 92   The District Attorney subsequently filed an interlocutory 
appeal to the Third Circuit.93 The Third Circuit declined to consider the 
First Amendment freedom of expression claim because the parties did 
not defend the claim before the court, but the court would allow the 
parties to continue with the claim in the event that the case proceeded on 
the merits.94 
The Third Circuit decided that the District Attorney’s original 
threat of prosecution was not a retaliatory measure against the exercise of 
the students and parents’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.95  The 
District Attorney’s threat of prosecution was made before the students 
exercised their First Amendment rights; thus the threat could not be 
classified as retaliatory.96  The circuit court found, however, that future 
prosecution by the District Attorney would be a retaliatory act and 
affirmed the injunction on this ground.97  Because the students had, by 
that point, exercised their rights by not attending the sexting program, 
any future prosecution would be akin to retaliation.  Retaliation, 
however, could not have occurred before the students exercised their 
rights. 
Although the plaintiffs in Miller failed to successfully establish that 
the District Attorney had retaliated against the exercise of their 
constitutional rights, the Court concluded that future prosecution would 
be retaliation.98  Thus, the Court proceeded to make findings under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 to support its decision for an injunction.  A plaintiff must 
prove three elements under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to establish a retaliation 
claim: that the plaintiff engaged in a constitutionally protected act; that 
the government’s response to that act was retaliatory; and that the 
protected actions caused the retaliation. 99   The court found that the 
plaintiffs satisfied all three elements.100 
First, plaintiffs satisfied the first element of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by 
demonstrating that their conduct was protected by the Constitution.  
Plaintiffs asserted that the District Attorney infringed on their Fourteenth 
Amendment right to raise their children as they saw fit without 
                                                                                                             
 92 Id. at 145. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Miller, 598 F.3d at 148. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 149. 
 98 Id. at 149–50. 
 99 Id. at 147. 
 100 Miller, 598 F.3d at 150, 152, 153. 
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governmental interference.101  Here, the parents objected to the pedagogy 
that instructed students that their actions were per se “wrong.”102  The 
parents also did not agree with the educators teaching their children 
views about a girl’s role in society, when they did not share the same 
views. 103   Specifically, one parent objected to the teaching that her 
daughter’s “actions were morally ‘wrong,’” and argued that the program 
turned her daughter into a victim because it contradicted the “beliefs she 
wishes to instill in her daughter.”104  The Third Circuit agreed and stated 
that the District Attorney cannot coerce parents into allowing state actors 
to impose their ideas about “morality and gender roles” on the 
children.105  The District Attorney could offer the education program as a 
truly voluntary program, but could not threaten prosecution for failing to 
attend it.106  The court held that the plaintiffs are “likely to succeed in 
showing that the education program required by the District Attorney 
impermissibly usurped and violated [their] fundamental right[s] to raise 
[their] child[ren] without undue state interference.”107 
The plaintiffs further satisfied the first element of their § 1983 
claim by alleging that defendant’s actions violated their First 
Amendment right to be free from compelled speech.108  Specifically, they 
argued that the program’s paper-writing requirement constituted 
compelled speech, particularly because the paper necessitated the 
conclusion that the students’ appearances in the photographs were 
morally wrong.109  The court agreed and held that, at this early stage, it 
was likely that the plaintiffs could prove that the program would violate 
the students’ First Amendment rights.110 
The second element of a retaliation claim requires that the 
government respond with a retaliatory act.111  An act is retaliatory if it is 
“sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his 
constitutional rights.”112  The court held that in this instance, the District 
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Attorney’s actions qualified as retaliatory because “[t]here is no doubt a 
prosecution meets this test and the District Attorney does not argue 
otherwise.”113 
The third element of a retaliation claim is causation.114  There must 
be a causal connection between the first two elements: the plaintiffs’ 
constitutionally protected activity and the District Attorney’s retaliatory 
act.115  The Third Circuit found that this connection existed because of 
the District Attorney’s own statement that he would “respond”116 to the 
plaintiff’s decision to forego the educational program by prosecuting 
her.117  The court emphasized that an offer to attend a pre-indictment 
program followed by prosecution for refusal to attend the program would 
not constitute causation for retaliation in every instance.118  Rather, the 
key factor for the retaliation claim is that the plaintiffs’ choice not to 
participate in the sexting educational program is protected under the 
Constitution.119  Thus, the court ensured that, under its holding, programs 
such as court-ordered traffic school or mandated Alcoholics Anonymous 
meetings could not be considered retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Additionally, the court noted that any future prosecution of the 
students for additional crimes in connection with the sexts at issue would 
be a retaliatory act due to the District Attorney’s lack of evidence.120  
There was no probable cause to charge plaintiffs with possession or 
distribution of child pornography.121  The District Attorney asserted that 
their mere appearance in the photographs constituted sufficient grounds 
to bring charges against the students, but the court found that being 
photographed is not evidence of possessing or distributing child 
pornography. 122   The Third Circuit, however, allowed the District 
Attorney the opportunity to vacate the injunction if he produced evidence 
of probable cause at a later time.123 
Thus, the Third Circuit found that without injunctive relief from the 
court, the students and parents would either have to relinquish their 
Fourteenth and First Amendment rights to evade prosecution or maintain 
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those rights but face prosecution.124  The court held that the “Hobson’s 
Choice” the District Attorney presented the students was 
unconstitutional.125  The Third Circuit concluded that the “plaintiffs have 
shown a likelihood of success on their claims that any prosecution would 
not be based on probable cause . . . but instead in retaliation” for the 
exercise of constitutionally protected rights.126  Thus, the court affirmed 
the district court’s award of a preliminary injunction.127 
III. ANALYSIS: SEXTING EDUCATIONAL CLASSES DO NOT 
AUTOMATICALLY VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS 
Some parents, like those in Miller, claim that the government 
cannot regulate their child’s sexting activity because of their Fourteenth 
Amendment right to raise their child without government interference.  
This right, however, is not absolute.128  The government can limit this 
right and use its role as parens patriae to regulate sexting when a child’s 
safety or well being is in danger. 129   Thus, the government has the 
authority to regulate sexting through educational programs. 
A.  Parental Fourteenth Amendment Rights 
Although the Third Circuit held that the state could not 
constitutionally require students to attend a sexting educational program, 
its holding was narrow and does not preclude the institution of sexting 
educational programs per se.  The court in Miller held that future 
retaliation by the District Attorney would be unconstitutional because it 
would deprive the students of their rights by requiring them to either 
attend the program or face criminal prosecution.130  Under the facts of 
Miller and the court’s focus on a retaliatory act of the District 
Attorney, 131  the Third Circuit correctly decided the case. The Third 
Circuit, however, ruled too broadly in its more general holding: that the 
requirement that children attend a program that educates students about 
the dangers of sexting violates the Fourteenth Amendment.  On the 
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contrary, absent retaliation by a state official in violation of 42 U.S.C § 
1983, a court is likely to rule that requiring students to attend an 
educational program about sexting does not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the government has a compelling interest in 
protecting children from the harmful effects of sexting. 
1. History of the Protection of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Even though the court in Miller found that requiring sexting 
education classes likely violates a parent’s Fourteenth Amendment right 
to raise his or her children without governmental interference,132 it is 
more likely that the government can require students to participate in 
sexting education classes without infringing on Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.  The decision in Miller is not fatal to the principle that children in 
public schools may be required to take educational classes about sexting.  
Although the Fourteenth Amendment protects a parent’s right to raise his 
or her children without government interference, this protection is not 
absolute. 133   There are circumstances in which the government can 
intervene in parenting decisions and the Supreme Court has upheld such 
interference.134 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
that, 
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.135 
The Supreme Court has held that a parent’s right to raise his or her 
child without governmental interference under the Fourteenth 
Amendment is a fundamental right.136 
A court must apply strict scrutiny when examining cases that 
involve an alleged infringement of a person’s Fourteenth Amendment 
right.137  This is the highest standard the court can apply in evaluating 
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whether the government has an interest that conflicts with the 
constitutional right of a citizen.138  In order to survive strict scrutiny, the 
government must have a compelling interest that justifies interfering with 
a person’s constitutional right.139  Additionally, the interference must be 
narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interest.140  The court must 
also look at the means by which the state attempts to accomplish its 
purpose and decide whether they are reasonable.141 
A parent’s Fourteenth Amendment right to make decisions about 
raising his or her child has been developed through several decisions 
from the Supreme Court of the United States.  The first Supreme Court 
case to discuss the parental right was Meyer v. Nebraska.142  In Meyer, a 
Nebraska state law prohibited teaching a language other than English to 
any child in eighth grade or any student twelve years of age or under.143  
The Court held that parents have a Fourteenth Amendment right to allow 
the teacher to teach the language.144  Additionally, the Court held that the 
Nebraska law interfered with parental authority to manage the education 
of one’s children.145 
Next, the Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters146 held that 
the right of parents to choose the upbringing of their children is 
fundamental.147  In this case, the Compulsory Education Act of 1922 
required every parent or guardian to send his or her children between the 
ages of eight and sixteen to a public school; thus, the law excluded 
private schools as a possible means to educate children between ages 
eight and sixteen. 148   The Supreme Court held that the Compulsory 
Education Act “unreasonably” interfered with the right of parents and 
guardians to control the upbringing of their children and the ability to 
make educational decisions for them, including where to send their 
children to school.149  The Court notably stated that “[t]he child is not the 
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mere creature of the [s]tate; those who nurture him and direct his destiny 
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him 
for additional obligations.”150 
Nearly fifty years later, the Supreme Court returned to the 
discussion of compulsory education laws in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 151  
Wisconsin law required children to attend either public or private school 
until they reached the age of sixteen.152  The Supreme Court extended the 
Pierce decision and held that the state could not force parents to send 
their children to a formal school because it violated parents’ rights under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.153  The Court also noted that there 
was no evidence of “any harm to the physical or mental health of the 
child[ren] or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare” that would 
potentially allow for the state to step in and regulate their education.154 
Recent Supreme Court decisions have reiterated these earlier 
holdings, which clearly demand that courts bolster the Fourteenth 
Amendment by protecting against governmental attempts to control the 
education of the nation’s children.  Justice Ginsburg, in M.L.B. v. 
S.L.J., 155  stated that “choices about marriage, family life, and the 
upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has 
ranked as of basic importance in our society, rights sheltered by the 
Fourteenth Amendment against the [s]tate’s unwarranted usurpation, 
disregard, or disrespect.”156  The most recent case on the issue of parents’ 
fundamental right to raise their children is Troxel v. Granville.157  In 
Troxel, the Supreme Court struck down a state law that allowed third 
parties, including grandparents, to petition for visitation rights over the 
protests of the child’s parents.158  The Court reiterated: “the interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps 
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this 
Court.”159  The Supreme Court has consistently held parents’ Fourteenth 
Amendment rights in high regard in the past.160 
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The developing problem of sexting has recently fueled the debate 
about when the government has the authority to limit parents’ Fourteenth 
Amendment right to raise their children without government 
interference.  At first glance, a mandatory sexting education course 
seems to conflict with the fundamental right because parents’ rights to 
choose whether their children participate in these programs seems to fall 
under the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Parents could argue 
that these classes conflict with their beliefs and how they want their 
children raised.  Thus, following the standard set out by the Supreme 
Court over the past century, it seems that a mandatory sexting education 
class would infringe on a parent’s Fourteenth Amendment right.  But the 
parental right to raise one’s child without government interference is not 
a complete freedom, and the government may be able to impose the 
sexting program on the students under certain circumstances. 161 
2. Limitations on Parents’ Fourteenth Amendment Rights 
Protection of a parent’s Fourteenth Amendment right to make 
decisions regarding how to raise his or her child is not absolute.  The 
state can interfere with parenting decisions if it is necessary to protect a 
child.  For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the defendant was 
convicted of violating state child labor laws by allowing her child to 
preach on the street and sell religious pamphlets.162  The Court departed 
from its earlier decisions restricting the government’s interference with 
parents’ control over their children and held that when it is in the 
public’s interest, “the family itself is not beyond regulation.”163  The 
court recognized that when it is necessary to protect a child’s safety and 
well being the state can act as parens patriae and can “restrict the 
parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting 
the child’s labor and in many other ways.”164  Thus, the Court held that 
the need to protect children from harm or exploitation justified the state’s 
interference. 
The Court has also indicated that the state has broader authority 
over the lives and activities of children than it has over adults.165  For 
example, in Prince, the Court held that the state has the power to control 
the conduct of children in order to protect them against the dangers of 
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preaching religion on a highway.166  The Court reasoned that “[p]arents 
may be free to become martyrs themselves.  But it does not follow they 
are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children 
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they 
can make that choice for themselves.” 167   Here, the Supreme Court 
appropriately balanced parents’ Fourteenth Amendment right against the 
state’s right to intervene for the welfare and safety of children. 
The Supreme Court has not only held that government may 
intervene in a parental decision normally protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment due to its parens patriae power, but the Court has also held 
that a public school system may intervene in certain circumstances 
because public schools are recognized as “instruments of the state.”168  
As such, school officials can restrict students’ rights when they exercise 
their authority as in loco parentis in order to protect the students at 
school. 169   Courts have recognized that because children spend a 
significant amount of the day in school, while in school they are in the 
custody of the school system.170 
The Third Circuit in Gruenke v. Siep171 held that there are situations 
in which school officials need to impose standards and restrict the 
conduct of students even when parents may disagree.172  These situations 
arise because the school must “maintain order and a proper educational 
atmosphere.”173  In Gruenke, the parents of a high school student sued a 
high school swim team coach under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for requiring their 
daughter to take a pregnancy test in violation of her First and Fourth 
Amendment rights.174  The Third Circuit accepted that there are times 
when the school’s views and actions may conflict with the parents’ right 
to raise their children.175  When such a conflict occurs, the parents’ right 
should take precedent over the school’s policies unless “the school’s 
action is tied to a compelling interest.”176  In Gruenke, the Third Circuit 
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decided that the coach’s actions were unreasonable and violated the 
student’s rights; however, the court held that there are some instances 
where this conduct would be reasonable, such as when there is a 
legitimate concern for the student’s health.177  Significantly, the court 
stated that the right to familial privacy is inevitably restricted while 
students are in a public school setting where “the state’s power is 
‘custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control 
that could not be exercised over free adults.’”178 
Further, the Third Circuit, in C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of 
Education,179 held that there are times when “the parental right to control 
the upbringing of a child must give way to a school’s ability to control 
curriculum and the school environment.”180  In this case, students in the 
seventh through twelfth grades were asked to complete a survey entitled, 
“Profiles of Student Life: Attitudes and Behaviors.” 181   The survey 
consisted of questions involving the students’ “drug and alcohol use, 
sexual activity, experience of physical violence, attempts at suicide, 
personal associations and relationships (including the parental 
relationship), and views on matters of public interest.”182  The court held 
that even if the survey was a requirement, it did not amount to a violation 
of a family’s constitutional right to privacy.183  Further, the court stated 
that “[i]t is clear . . . that [a parent’s right to control a child’s upbringing 
and education] is neither absolute nor unqualified.”184  Finally, the court 
decided that the school officials did not violate the students’ 
constitutional rights.185 
The dangers of sexting justify a limitation on parents’ Fourteenth 
Amendment right to raise their children without governmental 
intervention because the potential harm caused by sexting poses a 
significant threat to the public interest.  As previously discussed, 
teenagers who are caught sexting face potential criminal charges for the 
dissemination or viewing of child pornography, the possible 
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dissemination of their own private sexual images, and bullying.186  In 
addition, it is necessary for the government to protect children’s well 
being and safety because many are vulnerable and unable to make 
mature decisions; the choice to sext is clearly one of these decisions. 
In particular, when sexting occurs at a public school during school 
hours, the sexting falls within the bounds of both the government and the 
school board’s compelling interests.  A student’s act of sexting can 
interfere with the educational atmosphere.  The school needs to 
affirmatively act in order to protect a student who directly engages in 
sexting, as well as to safeguard all other students who may be affected by 
such conduct.  The compelling interest of both the school and the state 
justifies any infringement on a parent’s right to raise his or her child that 
is affected by the sexting education class requirement. 
3. Additional Limitations on Parents’ Fourteenth Amendment 
Rights with Respect to Education 
Courts have found that parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights are 
subject to government intervention when there is potential for substantial 
harm to the child.187  Additionally, the government has imposed other 
limitations on parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights, further indicating 
that this right is not absolute.188   When it comes to education, both 
children’s rights and parents’ rights are limited.  Thus, with respect to 
sexting in the educational atmosphere, parents’ Fourteenth Amendment 
rights should also be limited.  This discussion will focus on those 
requirements the states in the Third Circuit impose that effectively limit 
parents’ with respect to their children’s education. 
First, the state can mandate compulsory education attendance 
through state truancy laws.189  New Jersey law requires parents to send 
their children, ages six through sixteen, to public school or a school that 
would provide an equivalent standard of education.190  The courts have 
also held that the statute enforcing mandatory attendance is constitutional 
and that education, “is a matter of public concern and legislative 
regulation and should be enforced as long as the requirements are 
reasonable.”191 
In Pennsylvania, a compulsory school attendance law requires 
every child of the “compulsory school age” who resides in the state to 
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attend school. 192   The statute defines “compulsory school age” as 
between the ages of eight and seventeen. 193   The State Board of 
Education must provide standards for the subjects and activities that all 
children must learn in school.194  The subjects must be taught in English, 
and the child must continuously attend school throughout the entire time 
public school is in session.195  The statute also provides an allowance for 
children to attend private schools, boarding schools, and to be home 
schooled as long as the education meets the standards set out by the State 
Board of Education.196  Parents or guardians who do not comply with this 
law are subject to fines, required attendance of a parenting course, or 
even jail time.197  One of Pennsylvania’s two Superior Courts has held 
that the compulsory education laws are not unconstitutionally overbroad 
or vague.198 
  Finally, Delaware laws require compulsory attendance for 
children between the ages of five and sixteen years old.199  The statutes 
require anyone who has legal custody of a child in this age range to 
enroll the child in public school, where the student must attend the 
minimum number of school days and attend any activity required by 
state law.200  The statute states that a student is considered a “truant” if he 
or she misses three or more days of school per year without a valid 
excuse.201  The statute also allows students to enroll in private school or 
to receive homeschooling so long as they would receive an education 
that is equivalent to the curriculum required in public schools.202 
Second, schools and the government also regulate children’s 
activities in schools through mandatory subjects and curriculum.  One 
subject of controversy is sexual education classes.  Sexual education 
requirements vary from state to state.  New Jersey requires schools to 
offer classes that provide lessons on abstinence and sexually transmitted 
disease (STD) prevention. 203   Similarly, Delaware public schools are 
legally required to provide sex education and information, but also must 
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include other contraception information.204  In Pennsylvania, however, 
schools are not legally required to offer a sex education class; instead, 
they are merely required to be able to give information on abstinence and 
methods for STD prevention if students inquire about it.205 
In Smith v. Ricci,206 the New Jersey Supreme Court examined the 
constitutionality of a sex education course requirement.  The State Board 
of Education required school districts to teach a “family life” educational 
program.207  The Board’s regulation also included an “excusal clause,” 
which stated that if a parent or guardian did not agree with any part of 
the educational program because it conflicted with their moral or 
religious beliefs, then the child would be excused from only the portion 
of the program that was in conflict; however, the regulation still required 
the student to attend the remaining portion of the class.208  Despite this 
clause, parents challenged the regulation by arguing that the program 
infringed on the students’ and parents’ First Amendment rights of 
freedom of religion.209  They also argued that the educational program 
was an establishment of religion. 210   The court held that because it 
included an option for parents to remove their children from the portions 
of the program that violated their beliefs, the regulation did not infringe 
on parent or children’s rights.211 
The plaintiffs also argued that the program violated parents’ rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to raise their children. 212   They 
claimed that there was no reasonable relation between the requirement of 
an educational program and the goals that this educational program 
sought to achieve.213  The court, however, held that the program did not 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, because it was a reasonable and 
necessary means to achieve the school’s interest in the “reduction of 
teenage pregnancy, venereal disease, and other social problems.” 214  
Thus, if a sexting education program is narrowly tailored to the 
government’s goal of preventing the dangers associated with sexting, and 
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the program is a necessary means of achieving that goal, then it is 
unlikely that the imposition of such a program would violate parents’ 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
IV. LIMITATIONS ON CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
The government can also constitutionally require students to attend 
sexting education classes because children’s constitutional rights are not 
as expansive as those of adults.215   Although the government cannot 
threaten criminal prosecution if an adult exercises a constitutionally 
protected right, children’s constitutional rights are restricted, especially 
while in school.216  This limitation is due to the state’s role as a custodian 
or in loco parentis to the children in its jurisdiction.217 
In Bellotti v. Baird,218 the Supreme Court held that minors are in a 
unique position and their rights are not equal to those of adults.219  The 
Court stated that “the peculiar vulnerability of children” and “their 
inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner” 
are justifications for the necessary reduction of a child’s rights.220  Courts 
have applied this concept to hold that laws that limit the rights of minors, 
such as age limits on marriage, are constitutional.221 
Further, the Supreme Court has given schools the discretion to limit 
the rights of students while they are in the school’s custody by 
diminishing students’ Fourth Amendment rights. 222   The Court has 
justified this limitation by invoking the school’s special need to protect 
children on school grounds.223  The Fourth Amendment provides that 
individuals have the right to “be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and that this 
right “shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”224  In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,225 the Court held that there are limits 
on the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protection when school authorities 
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perform searches while children are on school property.226  The Court 
stressed that ordinarily the Fourth Amendment protects students from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 227   Reasonable expectations of 
privacy, however, are more limited for students in school than they are 
elsewhere.228 
The Supreme Court noted that school officials have the authority to 
limit students’ rights in order to foster public policy. 229   The Court 
explained that there is a need to balance the students’ right to privacy and 
the school’s interest in providing a proper educational atmosphere.230  In 
balancing these interests, “[i]t is evident that the school setting requires 
some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities 
are ordinarily subject.”231  Due to this necessity, the Supreme Court held 
that a warrant is not necessary for school authorities to search a student’s 
person or property while that student is under the school’s control.232  
Therefore, school officials do not need to meet the high level of probable 
cause to search students, so long as they have a reasonable suspicion.233  
The Court concluded that, for the school to have the ability to maintain 
order, the “legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the 
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”234  Thus, a 
search will be justified when a school official has “reasonable grounds 
for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has 
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.”235 
The Third Circuit’s ruling in Miller seems consistent with the trend 
towards reducing privacy rights and increasing government interference 
with schoolchildren’s rights, which the Supreme Court began with its 
ruling in T.L.O.  Ten years later, in Vernonia School District v. Acton,236 
the Supreme Court strengthened the holding in T.L.O. by further 
narrowing constitutional protections for students. 237   In Vernonia, an 
Oregon school district had instituted a student athlete drug policy that 
called for random drug testing of student athletes.238  The issue before the 
Court was whether this policy violated the students’ Fourth and 
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Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Under the policy, all students in the 
school who wanted to play sports were required to sign a form 
consenting to random drug testing and to obtain the written consent of 
their parents.239  The school tested the athletes at the beginning of the 
season and then randomly tested ten percent of the athletes each week 
during their sports season.240 
The Supreme Court stated that courts must apply a reasonableness 
standard to determine whether such searches are constitutional.241  This 
standard requires balancing the degree of governmental infringement on 
a person’s Fourth Amendment right against the government’s interest.242  
When there are “special needs,” a warrant is not required for a search; 
when a warrant is not required, neither is probable cause.243  The Court 
stated that “special needs” are present in the school setting because 
minors are not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection 
that is accorded to adults.244  For example, minors do not have the same 
rights to liberty—”the right to come and go at will”—because their 
parent or guardian controls their physical freedom.245   When parents 
place their children in private school, the school officials must act in loco 
parentis to the children, and when children are placed in public schools, 
the officials have a “custodial and tutelary” power over them.246  This 
creates control over minors that is not constitutionally permissible with 
respect to adults.247  The Supreme Court clarified, however, that students 
do not lose their rights entirely when they are at school; the “nature of 
those rights” only becomes what is “appropriate for children in 
school.”248  The Court concluded that “Fourth Amendment rights, no less 
than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public 
schools than elsewhere.”249 
The Supreme Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier250 
also held that students’ rights, which would ordinarily be constitutionally 
protected, are limited while in the custody of the school. 251   In 
Kuhlmeier, a group of students claimed that various school officials 
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violated their First Amendment right to free speech when the officials 
removed two articles from the school newspaper. 252   One article 
concerned pregnant teenagers within the school and sexuality of students, 
while the other discussed how students were affected by their parents’ 
divorces. 253   School officials were concerned about protecting the 
identity of the pregnant teenagers as well as protecting younger students 
from the “inappropriate” references to teen sexuality and birth control 
discussed in the articles.254  The court held that students’ right to free 
expression can be limited if it “substantially interfere[s] with the work of 
the school or impinge[s] upon the rights of other students.” 255  
Additionally, it is for the school, not a federal court, to decide what 
conduct is inappropriate within the school, and whether that conduct can 
be restricted.256 
The aforementioned cases—Bellotti,257 T.L.O.,258 and Kuhlmeier259 
—demonstrate the Supreme Court’s mandate that, in certain 
circumstances, schools may have a compelling interest that justifies their 
interference with parents’ and children’s constitutional rights.260  Clearly, 
children’s constitutional rights can be limited in the school setting.261  
Thus, if a school system establishes that protecting students from sexting 
is a compelling interest, and also shows that providing sexting education 
classes is narrowly tailored to protect that interest, then such classes 
would be immune from claims by parents or students arguing that these 
classes violate their constitutional rights.  Because students are under the 
custody of school officials while attending school,262 the school has a 
compelling interest in protecting them from the dangers of sexting.  
Additionally, the school has an interest in protecting other students from 
the disruptions that sexting can cause in their education.263 
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V.  POSSIBLE REMEDIES TO SOLVE THE TEENAGE SEXTING PROBLEM 
Sexting is a pervasive problem that has generated a compelling 
state interest and is a problem that needs to be solved through 
government intervention.  Retaliatory prosecution, like that in Miller, of 
a student who elects not to attend a sexting education program is not the 
correct way to solve the problem of sexting.  Like truancy and child 
labor, sexting is another danger against which the government should 
protect children by following the pattern of limiting parents’ Fourteenth 
Amendment rights and children’s rights.  There are two potential 
solutions to the sexting problem that call for government intervention 
rather than retaliatory prosecution. 
One option would require state legislatures to create sexting 
educational classes or integrate sexting education into their family and 
sex education classes.  Education is an important starting point to solving 
the problem of teenage sexting.  Unlike the situation in Miller, in which 
the implementation of classes only came after students were caught 
sexting, implementing these programs would help to prevent the problem 
through preemptive action.  Implementation of sexting education courses 
is also likely to evade Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny by the courts 
because the government has a compelling interest in regulating 
children’s sexting activities.264  If, however, courts find that requiring 
students to attend a sexting education program does violate the 
Constitution, the government may still be able to teach students about the 
dangers of sexting by imposing the requirement to make the sexting class 
an option or by utilizing an excusal clause. 
The second potential solution to the sexting problem in schools is to 
create specific sexting criminal legislation.  Currently, many states have 
responded to the problem in this manner.265  Pennsylvania, the home 
state of Miller, is in the process of approving a bill—House Bill 815—
that would make sexting among minors a second-degree misdemeanor 
crime, instead of a felony.266  On May 23, 2011, the Pennsylvania House 
of Representatives approved the bill, and it currently awaits the Senate’s 
approval.267 
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The bill defines the offense of “sexting” as “ knowingly 
transmit[ing] an electronic communication or disseminat[ing] a depiction 
of himself or another minor, or possess[ing] a depiction of another 
minor, engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”268  The bill, however, will 
not cover the depictions of minors engaged in sexual activity, which is 
punishable under other Pennsylvania laws regarding the sexual abuse of 
a child.269  It also does not apply to depictions of a minor engaged in 
“sexually explicit conduct,” if the depiction was “taken, made, produced, 
used or intended to be used for or in furtherance of a commercial 
purpose.” 270   This offense would also be punishable under different 
Pennsylvania laws.271 
Pennsylvania State Representative and the bill’s sponsor, Seth 
Grove, stated that the goal of the sexting bill “ensures that students don’t 
ruin the rest of their life because of making some childish decisions, and 
sending nude photographs of themselves or others.”272  Because of this 
goal, the bill also allows for a minor to avoid prosecution, through 
judicial discretion, by permitting the minor to participate in a 
diversionary program and allowing for eventual expungement.273 
Parents are likely to challenge any statute concerning sexting by 
arguing that it infringes on their Fourteenth Amendment rights to raise 
their children without governmental interference.  As explained in Part 
IV, 274  however, this right is not absolute and the state can regulate 
sexting over parents’ objections.  Sexting is not only a private problem 
between the child and the parent; it is a public concern.  Parents may lack 
the ability to catch the sexting or to effectively deter future behavior.  
Parents also may choose not to punish their children because they do not 
believe sexting is wrong.  Although some parents may not believe that 
sexting is wrong, the dangers of sexting certainly could have a negative 
effect upon a child’s future and on the welfare of society.  Without 
proper guidance and prevention, the sexting phenomenon is likely to 
escalate, leading to an increase in the harms that stem from sexting, such 
as bullying.275  This is a significant harm to children and, as such, the 
government is justified in protecting against the harm.  Thus, there is a 
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strong justification for the government to intervene by educating children 
about the effects of sexting. 
Other states are also looking into legislative alternatives to the 
criminal prosecution of sexting.  On September 27, 2011, New Jersey’s 
Acting Governor, Kim Guadagno, signed new sexting legislation into 
law.276  The law creates a “diversionary” education program for juveniles 
who are criminally charged for sexting or posting sexual images.277  This 
program is intended to be an “alternative to prosecution” of minors who 
are “charged with a criminal offense for posting sexually suggestive or 
sexually explicit photographs, or who engage in the behavior commonly 
known as ‘sexting,’ in which these pictures are transmitted via cell 
phones.”278   It will be limited to juveniles who are charged with an 
offense under the New Jersey statute that protects against the 
endangerment of children’s welfare; such endangerment includes the 
“creation, exhibition or distribution without malicious intent of a 
photograph depicting nudity . . . through the use of an interactive 
wireless communications device or a computer.”279 
The bill gives the prosecutor the discretion of admitting the minor 
into the program; additionally, those who complete the program avoid 
prosecution.280  If the prosecutor does not exercise this discretion, court 
intake services can recommend the diversionary program based on the 
following factors: the severity of the offense or conduct and the 
circumstances surrounding the act, the offender’s “age and maturity,” 
whether the juvenile is a “substantial danger to others,” the juvenile’s 
family history and circumstances, including drug, alcohol, or child abuse, 
whether the juvenile or his family have had prior interaction with court 
intake services, the outcome, the result of those interactions, the 
availability of the educational program, recommendations by the victim, 
arresting officer, recommendation by the prosecutor, and the 
“amenability of the juvenile to participation in a remedial education or 
counseling program.”281 
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The proposed educational program would consist of the “juvenile’s 
participation in a remedial education or counseling program.”282  It will 
educate juveniles about the “legal consequences and penalties for sharing 
sexually suggestive or explicit materials,” as well as the “non-legal 
consequences,” such as the effect the activity could have on relationships 
and the damage it could do to the child’s future opportunities in 
employment and education, and the effect it could have on current school 
activities.283  Additionally, the program would discuss the “long-term and 
unforeseen consequences for sharing sexually suggestive or explicit 
materials” and the connection between bullying, cyber-bullying and 
sharing the material.284  The state’s Attorney General and the New Jersey 
Judiciary will develop the educational program.285  The law will go into 
effect in April 2012.286 
Bill A-4069 helps avoid decisions like the one in Miller, because it 
creates an educational program in lieu of prosecution before an act takes 
place.  By offering this discretion to prosecutors, the legislature avoids 
the issue of prosecution as retaliation; yet, the bill could still face 
Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny.  As explained in Parts III and IV, 
however, the state’s interest in protecting children is a significant and 
compelling reason to limit this right. 
Out of these options, a sexting education class is the best choice to 
prevent the sexting problem before it escalates, because it would teach 
children about how a sext could greatly affect and damage their futures.  
The number of prosecutions teenagers could face would likely be 
reduced if they were informed about the dangers of sexting and were 
instructed that sexting could lead to criminal child pornography charges.  
The proposed legislation is also laudable because it seeks to avoid 
automatic prosecution for a child who sexts.  Although New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania are creating criminal statutes, these statutes are acceptable 
because they first give children a chance to learn from their mistakes.  
The statutes provide opportunities for children to learn about the dangers 
of sexting before they are charged with a crime and before anything is 
placed on their record. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The practice of teenage sexting implicates many issues arising from 
teenagers’ actions.  One of the most important aspects of the problem is 
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the question of whether schools should be able to educate teens about the 
dangers associated with sexting, with the intention that such education 
will curb the increase in the growing number of teenagers who sext.  
Miller v. Mitchell illustrated one attempt to deter the problem: offer 
children the option of taking a sexting education class.287  Although the 
retaliatory means employed by the District Attorney in this case were 
held unconstitutional, ordinary sexting educational programs likely 
would avoid the same fate.  Even though the program will have to 
withstand judicial strict scrutiny, the government’s compelling interest in 
protecting the nation’s teenagers will likely be enough to overcome 
constitutional protection.  Even if the courts do not consider the 
government’s interest to be sufficiently compelling to survive strict 
scrutiny, it is still vital to educate children about the dangers of sexting.  
The government can try to educate students by creating sexting classes or 
introducing antisexting material into already formed sex education 
classes in schools.  To survive constitutional protections, the government 
could also make such sexting programs optional or institute an excusal 
clause for parents who do not want their children to participate in these 
classes. 
The sexting educational programs proposed in this Comment are 
only a starting point for preventing child sexting practices.  
Unfortunately, these programs cannot control what children do outside of 
school and cannot ensure that children will listen and absorb what the 
programs are teaching.  It is important to start somewhere, however, and 
the classes can provide necessary lessons about the dangers of sexting.  If 
an educational program can save one child’s future by informing him or 
her about the consequences of sexting, then the government should 
attempt to provide the program in a sufficiently tailored manner so as to 
withstand strict constitutional scrutiny. 
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